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We examine the driving forces of G-7 business cycles. We decompose national business cycles into
common and nation-specific components using a dynamic factor model. We also do this for driving
variables found in business cycle models: productivity; measures of fiscal and monetary policy; the
terms of trade and oil prices. We find a large common factor in oil prices, productivity, and the terms
of trade. Productivity is the main driving force, with other drivers isolated to particular nations or sub-periods.
Along these lines, we document shifts in the correlation of the G-7 component of each driver with


















￿What are the driving forces of international business cycles?￿ This has been
one of the central questions in the extensive literature on business cycles. The
question is a challenging one since there are many driving forces to consider,
including total factor productivity shocks, ￿scal and monetary policy shocks, oil
price shocks, shocks to the terms of trade, shocks to preferences, news and many
others. Moreover, these driving forces are in￿ uenced by various domestic and
external factors and understanding the relative importance of these factors is
necessary to get a good grasp of the channels through which the driving forces
a⁄ect business cycles.
In order to answer this question, most previous work follows Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1992) focusing on total factor productivity as the single driving
variable with the world divided into home and foreign locations. While the most
common driving variable is total factor productivity, monetary and ￿scal policy
shocks along with many others have been receiving more emphasis over time.
The reason quantitative equilibrium models have focused on small dimen-
sional models in both the number of countries and number of driving variables
is tractability. There are two dimensions along which tractability is a concern.
The ￿rst is related to the ability of the researcher or the researcher￿ s audience
to sort out an expanding list of theoretical interactions as the dimension of the
model increases. To some extent this is alleviated by tracing out the time pro￿le
reaction of the macroeconomy to one shock in one location at a time. This is the
dynamic comparative statics counterpart to an impulse response function in time
series econometrics.
The second constraint is data limitations. Even if the researcher decides to
calibrate preferences and technology using existing micro-studies, thereby econ-
omizing on the number of parameters to estimate using macroeconomic series,
the number of remaining parameters necessary to capture the dynamic covariance
structure of the shocks grows rapidly with the dimension of the model. This is a
consequence of the need ￿in dynamic rational expectations models ￿to forecast
the future evolution of exogenous variables and their interdependence.
The objective of this paper is to provide a detailed analysis of a number of
driving forces of business cycles within and across G-7 countries over the period
1960-2005. We use the term driving force in the same manner as it is employed
in dynamic rational expectations models of the international business cycle ￿
variables assumed to be exogenous by the model builder. Our study contributes
2to the research program on international business cycles in three ways.
First, we mitigate the curse of dimensionality by employing dynamic factor
models. This allows us to characterize the stochastic processes for both endoge-
nous variables and exogenous variables.
Second, our methodology helps us to di⁄erentiate the domestic and external
factors in explaining these variables. We model the endogenous and exogenous
variables as the sum of three unobserved factors: a common G-7 factor, a nation-
speci￿c factor and an idiosyncratic factor. Aside from parsimony, this approach
lends itself to the interpretation of shocks as arising from common or nation-
speci￿c sources; a distinction which is central for a number of international busi-
ness cycle theories. For example, a class of intertemporal models of the current
account have the property that only idiosyncratic movements in exogenous vari-
ables lead to current account imbalances. Common factors are obvious candidates
for sources of international business cycle comovement, an enduring topic in the
literature.
Third, we have a comprehensive list of driving variables. In particular, our list
of driving variables includes total factor productivity, government expenditures,
the monetary base, short-term interest rates targeted by the central bank, the
relative price of oil and the terms of trade. Apart from parsing the endogenous
and exogenous variables into common, nation-speci￿c and idiosyncratic variation,
we also estimate the fraction of variation of output, consumption and investment
attributed to each component of each shock. This enables us to study the joint
properties of ￿ uctuations in output, consumption, and investment. Using multiple
macroeconomic aggregates, rather than just output, allows us to derive more
robust measures of common and nation-speci￿c business cycles.
Our analysis is carried out using a dynamic factor model. Dynamic factor mod-
els have increasingly become a popular econometric tool for quantifying the degree
of comovement among macroeconomic time series.1 Kose, Otrok and Whiteman
(2008) provide a brief survey of the literature employing these types of models
to study the extent of business cycles comovement. However, these models have
yet to be used to examine a large set of driving forces and their relationship
to macroeconomic variables. We characterize these relationships in terms of a
1While these models are often used to analyze the degree of business cycle comovement in the
international business cycle literature, they have also been employed in other contexts such as
forecasting and monetary policy analysis. See Otrok and Whiteman (1998) for an application to
a forecasting exercise, and Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) for an application to the analysis
of monetary policy.
3variance decomposition.
Our international business cycle variance decomposition is achieved using a
three step procedure. First, we use national data on output, consumption and
investment to estimate the common G-7, nation-speci￿c and idiosyncratic com-
ponents of each national business cycle. In step two, we use the same statistical
model to estimate the common G-7, nation-speci￿c and idiosyncratic components
of each driving variable.
In step three, we project measures of the components of the shocks on com-
ponents of the endogenous variables. The objective of this exercise is to generate
a variance decomposition of the common and nation-speci￿c components of G-7
business cycles into the common and nation-speci￿c components of our driving
variables. This allows us to answer the key question we are interested in ￿what
are the driving forces of international business cycles?￿We are also able to answer
narrower questions such as: ￿How much of the German business cycle is accounted
for by movements in G-7 productivity versus German productivity?￿
In a related paper, Gregory and Head (1999) employ dynamic factor analysis
and Kalman ￿ltering methods to analyze the sources of ￿ uctuations in productiv-
ity, investment and current account in the G-7 countries. They report that the
common ￿ uctuations have substantial impact on ￿ uctuations in both productivity
and investment in these countries, but very little impact on the current account.
Empirical work using vector autoregressions to identify structural shocks and in-
fer their contribution to output variance in an international context are few. An
important early contribution is Ahmed, Ickes, Wang and Yoo (1993). They allow
for home foreign and world supply shocks, a relative ￿scal shock, a relative prefer-
ence shock and a relative money shock. Their data sample includes the U.S. and
an aggregate of ￿ve major industrialized countries. They ￿nd that supply shocks
explain most of the variation in output.
In section 2, we explain how our empirical approach relates to existing dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models of international business cycles. Section
3 provides information about the dataset we use. Section 4 describes the ￿rst
step of our variance decomposition of output, consumption and investment into
the common and nation-speci￿c components. Section 5 explains the results of
variance decompositions of driving forces. Section 6 analyzes the importance of
the G-7 and nation-speci￿c driving variables in explaining ￿ uctuations in output,
consumption and investment. Section 7 concludes.
42. The model
In this section, we ￿rst describe how a standard linear international business cycle
model relates to our empirical framework. This serves to highlight the curse of
dimensionality which limits the number of sources and number of driving variables
in this class of models. Next, we provide a brief description of the dynamic factor
model we employ.
2.1. Linear business cycle models
The common methodological approach in the business cycle literature is to specify
tastes, technology, constraints and asset market structure. Parametric functional
forms are speci￿ed and either estimated or calibrated. Typically the models are
solved by linearizing the model around a steady-state level or balanced growth
path.
A convenient example given the focus of this paper is Baxter and Crucini
(1995). Their stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model may be conveniently
summarized by two systems of linear equations. Linear here simply means a set
of linear equations describing the equilibrium solution in either the levels of the
variables or their logarithms (which one depends on the method of linearization
employed).
The ￿rst system of equations describes the dynamic evolution of the vector of
state variables:
St = MSt￿1 + et (2.1)
While the system above is a ￿rst-order vector autoregression, it can be adapted to
richer dynamics in either the predetermined or exogenous variables by augmenting
the length of the state vector. The state vector contains the irreducible collection
of predetermined and exogenous variables necessary for agents to decide on their
current period choices. In the Baxter and Crucini model they are: home and
foreign capital stocks, kt and k￿
t, one of the bond stocks, b￿
t and domestic and
foreign total factor productivity, At and A￿
t.2
The second system of equations are the decision rules, linking the vector of
endogenous choices, Zt, to the current state vector, St:
Zt = ￿St (2.2)
2The other bond stock is redundant because world market clearing requires that b￿
t = ￿bt.
5Each row in this system is the decision rule for an economic choice variable. For
example, if the ￿rst element in Zt is domestic consumption, the ￿rst row of the
matrix ￿ contains the coe¢ cients that describe the current period responses of
consumption to each of the individual state variables. In the one sector two-
country bond economy with only productivity shocks, the state vector, St, has
only ￿ve elements as noted earlier. Home consumption is a positive function of
all four (the coe¢ cients in the ￿rst row of ￿ are positive).
A key facet of the dynamic structure is the strict exogeneity of a subset of the
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This may be written more compactly by collecting the predetermined choice vari-
ables (capital and bonds) into one vector and the exogenous variables (produc-
tivity shocks) into a second vector. The generic representation of the state and




















Here it should be understood that the elements of the vector of predetermined
and exogenous variables depend upon the model structure, the number of shocks
and number of countries. What all models share, though, is the zero restriction
in the lower left sub-matrix of the coe¢ cient matrix, representing the exogeneity
restriction placed on the vector of variables, Xt. The block of coe¢ cients imme-
diately to the right of the zero matrix is a matrix of coe¢ cients linking current
shocks to past shocks (it need not be ￿rst-order as assume here). The remaining
coe¢ cients of the system, denoted by the ￿￿ s, are complicated functions of all the
model￿ s deep structural parameters as well as those governing the dynamics of the
shocks, ￿ and  . The last feature worth noting is the innovation vector, containing
innovations to productivity at home and abroad, and zeros elsewhere. Since the
predetermined variables are assumed to be perfectly controlled by agents, there
are no random variations in them unrelated to the state vector itself.3
3One could certainly think of reasons to deviate from this assumption: random natural events
6This business cycle model implies that the data generated from such a model
has a representation as a dynamic factor model. In the example here output,
consumption and investment are all driven by two common factors ￿ home and
foreign technology. In contrast, our factor model will have a common produc-
tivity shock, seven nation-speci￿c shocks and idiosyncratic variation speci￿c to
the series. The canonical linear business cycle model lacks these idiosyncratic
components. However, there are a number of ways to break this exact (and coun-
terfactual) link between all variables in a business cycle model. For example,
Sargent (1989) shows how measurement error on the part of a statistical agency
would give rise to a model that meets the typical assumptions of a dynamic factor
model. In this case we would measure output, consumption and investment im-
perfectly, the estimated factor model on this data would then reveal three factors
(interpreted as world, home and foreign technology factors) as well as idiosyn-
cratic movements interpreted as measurement error. A second way is to introduce
sector speci￿c technology shocks as in Long and Plosser (1983). Such a model will
also give rise to a dynamic factor structure as their work shows that such shocks
generate a common business cycle. A third way is to introduce additional shocks,
such as monetary and ￿scal shocks.4
We focus on the business cycle properties of output, consumption and in-
vestment of the G-7 countries. Output is not directly chosen; in the prototype
business cycle model it is a function of home and foreign total factor productivity
and the inputs of labor and capital. E⁄ectively, then, the three choice variables
are consumption, labor e⁄ort and investment for each of the G-7 countries, a total
of 21 choice variables. Studying a large set of shocks, as we do, has a clear cost
as the dimensionality and parameters to be estimated quickly becomes unwieldy.
Focusing on the exogenous driving variables in the business cycle model, Xt,
Xt = ￿Xt￿1 + ￿t : (2.5)
this vector is made up of I (the number of countries) subvectors, X0
i;t = [Ai;t;mi;t
;gi;t;pi;t;qi;t], ordered as national productivity, a target of monetary policy (a
short-term interest rate and a narrow monetary aggregate), a ￿scal policy vari-
able (government spending, revenue and so forth), the relative price of oil and the
that destroy the capital stock, unanticipated in￿ ation eroding the real value of bonds if they are
nominally denominated, or simply measurement error.
4Forni and Reichlin (1998) develop a classical estimator for dynamic factor models and apply
it to disaggregated sectoral output in the US. Their identifying assumptions allow them to
identify these factors as sector speci￿c and aggregate technological shocks. Our complimentary
approach attempts to study the impact of a wider range of shocks.
7terms of trade. Thus even if we reduce the number of variables to the absolute
minimum, the minimum being total factor productivity, a single measure of ￿scal
and monetary policy and the relative price of oil, ￿ will contain 784 parameters
to be estimated, the same is true for the variance-covariance matrix of the innova-
tions. Even this is an understatement if the dynamics of the exogenous variables
extend beyond the ￿rst-order.
2.2. The dynamic factor model
To economize on the dimensionality of the system, we employ a dynamic factor
model. We study each driving variable separately and decompose the variation
in each variable into common, nation-speci￿c and variable speci￿c factors. In
particular, we combine multiple measures of each driving variable and estimate
the following factor model in growth rates:
￿xij;t = ￿ij + BijFt + bijfi;t + "ij;t . (2.6)
Suppose ￿xij;t is the growth rate of the jth empirical proxy for productivity
in country i. Then, Ft is a common productivity factor shared by the G-7,
fi;t is a nation-speci￿c productivity factor and "ij;t is measurement error. The
interpretation of measurement error here is that we have imperfect proxies for
true total factor productivity. The error term is assumed to be uncorrelated
cross-sectionally at all leads and lags, and follows an autoregressive process of
order pi for each element in the vector. The factor fi;t follows an autoregression
of order qk. The B￿ s and b￿ s are factor loadings on the common and nation-speci￿c
factors.
The estimation of the model is Bayesian and follows the procedure in Otrok
and Whiteman (1998). The priors on the model parameters are loose enough to
be uninformative except for the prior belief that the autoregressive polynomials
are stationary, which seems reasonable for data in growth rates. The estimation
procedure itself is based on the Gibbs sampler and is outlined in the Appendix.
There are at least three advantages to our approach. The ￿rst one is parsimony;
the number of parameters has been reduced from (I￿e)2 to (2￿I￿J￿e) where I is the
number of countries, J is the number of measures of the driving variable and e is
the number of driving variables. The decision rules go from having I￿e exogenous
in￿ uences to having 2 ￿ e exogenous in￿ uences. For example, if we consider the
number of exogenous variables discussed above, the number of parameters to be
estimated would go down from 784 to 42. This is a major advantage in the
8context of international business cycle research because the decision rules directly
capture the response of domestic consumption, say, to the common component of
that driving variable (shock). This would otherwise be captured in consumption
response by some weighted average of the coe¢ cients on each nation￿ s driving
variable.
Second, having the common component and nation-speci￿c component is very
useful in the context of international business cycle research. For example, Glick
and Rogo⁄ (1995) exploit the fact that a large class of models imply no current
account reaction to ￿ common shocks,￿which would imply a zero coe¢ cient on the
common (world) factor for the current account equation. Models of risk sharing
imply that consumption should respond to common shocks, not nation-speci￿c
ones, which is the opposite restriction on the coe¢ cients for the consumption
decision rule.
The third advantage is more descriptive, allowing us to compare the movements
of G-7 productivity with the G-7 component of output or the G-7 component of
￿scal policy. This leads one to immediately think about international business
cycle comovement in terms of common reactions to common shocks and, possibly,
asymmetric reactions to common shocks. Productivity movements naturally fall
into the former category and oil price shocks into the latter category if one chooses
to organize countries as net exporters and net importers as Backus and Crucini
(2000) do.
3. The data
To analyze the driving forces of international business cycles, we construct a com-
prehensive database of the main macroeconomic and driving variables. We use
annual data covering the period 1960-2005. Our selection of annual frequency
stems from the fact that we include a broad set of measures for driving vari-
ables, some of which are not available at higher frequencies. Our macroeconomic
aggregate for output is real gross domestic product, consumption is real private
consumption expenditure and investment is real gross private capital formation.
These series are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and World Eco-
nomic Outlook (WEO) database. For the driving variables, we separate them into
policy and non-policy variables; all are treated as strictly exogenous.
We use multiple measures of driving variables, not simply because the factor
model methodology requires it, but because di⁄erent measures of each driving
variable contain di⁄erent information about the theoretical variable of interest.
9An important by-product of the factor model is that the size of the idiosyncratic
component of a particular measure indicates the extent of independent variation
across competing measures of the same economic variable. This could be measure-
ment error or conceptual di⁄erences in the variable construction. Consequently,
empirical results that use the common factor may be more robust than those that
examine only a speci￿c measure, our analysis will help to distinguish these cases.
On the monetary policy side, we use short-term real interest rates and real
stocks of money, narrowly de￿ned. The interest rates we employ are call rates
and other short-term interest rates, including the T-Bill rates and Discount Rates.
These are most closely in￿ uenced by interest rates targeted directly by the central
banks, such as the Federal Funds rate in the United States. In our empirical work,
we use the ex post real interest rate, with in￿ ation measured using the CPI. The
real monetary aggregates are represented by the sum of money and quasi money
series, also de￿ ated by the CPI. Interest rates and monetary aggregates are from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF and CPI series are from
World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.
On the ￿scal policy side, we include total expenditure, government consump-
tion, and total revenue. This list is more extensive than is typically used in the
business cycle literature, allowing us to provide a broad ￿scal picture. The ￿scal
series are from the OECD and IFS sources, completed with the help of the WEO
database whenever the series are missing. The series are then de￿ ated by the CPI.
The non-policy variables are productivity, the relative price of crude petroleum
and the terms of trade. Productivity is the central focus of the international real
business cycle literature. We use four di⁄erent productivity measures. The ￿rst
two measures are based on the framework developed by Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (2005). These measures both use capital and labor input measures in the
computation of total factor productivity. One of the measures also includes
human capital in the decomposition. To construct these productivity series, we
employ data from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006).
The other two productivity measures use only labor data, not capital, which is
consistent with the approach used by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). The
￿rst uses gross domestic product and employment (number employed, not hours)
from the OECD. The second is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and uses
manufacturing output and total hours in manufacturing.
We have four prices of crude petroleum in U.S. dollars: i) the world average
price, ii) the Dubai price, iii) the Brent price and iv) the West Texas price. The
latter three are the products produced in the markets referenced, the ￿rst is
10an expenditure weighted average of these prices. These U.S. dollar prices are
converted to domestic currency and then de￿ ated by the domestic consumer price
index. These series are taken from the IFS.
The terms of trade is the price of exports relative to imports. We have two
measures, one taken from the WEO and the other from the IFS. In the former,
the terms-of-trade is the terms-of-trade of goods and services computed using the
trade shares of all trading partners. In the latter, terms-of-trade refers to the ratio
of unit value of exports to unit value of imports.
4. International business cycles
Following Gregory, Head and Raynauld (1997), we start by estimating a factor





















5fi;t + "ij;t . (4.1)
where the elements of the data vector are the growth rates of real gross domestic
product, real private consumption expenditure and real investment for country i,
respectively. The factor Ft is a common factor shared by all aggregates across
all of the G-7 countries and this is what we will refer to as the G-7 factor. The
quantitative impact of the G-7 factor on an individual macroeconomic aggregate
is determined by the factor loading Bij. These factor loadings are di⁄erent across
macroeconomic aggregates and across countries.5 Both the factors and the residual
entering the equation follow autoregressive processes. Innovations to both the
factors and the residuals are assumed to be contemporaneously uncorrelated.
An important starting point for our analysis is to compare the G-7 factor
with a well-known measure of the G-7 business cycle. The measure that we use
here is a country-size weighted average of the growth rates of the G-7 macroeco-
nomic aggregates. Following the methodology employed by Crucini (1997), we use
Purchasing Power Parity valuations to arrive at the country weights. While the
G-7 economies on average constitute about 50 percent of total world output, the
United States alone accounts for roughly 46 percent of G-7 output and this num-
ber drops dramatically to about 15 percent for Japan, the next largest member.
The G-7 share of world output has declined in recent decades as emerging mar-
ket economies, including China and India, have grown much faster than the G-7.
5To save space, we do not report factor loadings, these are available from us upon request.
11However, the G-7 cycle is still ￿in a value-weighted sense ￿a good approximation
to the world business cycle.
Figure 1 compares the estimated G-7 factor to a G-7 aggregate growth rate
computed as a country-weighted average of national output growth rates and
and to U.S. output growth.6 The correlation between U.S. output and the G-7
aggregate is 0.81 and is readily evident in the ￿gure. While this may re￿ ect
common disturbances and genuine business cycle propagation across the U.S. and
other G-7, it also re￿ ects the large economic weight of the U.S. in the construction
of the G-7 aggregate. To a ￿rst approximation, the G-7 business cycle looks like
a moderated version of the U.S. business cycle. The G-7 common real factor is
the smoothest of the three measures; its correlation with G-7 output growth is
0.84 compared to a mere 0.43 in the case of U.S. output. We conclude from this
that the simple view that the U.S. business cycle drives the G-7 cycle is not a
reasonable description of international business cycles.
Casual inspection of Figure 1 also indicates that the G-7 factor captures the
major economic events of the past four decades: the relatively steady expansion
of the 1960s; the rapid boom of the early 1970s; the sharp, but short recession of
the mid-1970s associated with the ￿rst oil price shock; the less abrupt and more
enduring recession of the early 1980s stemming from a variety of forces including
the tight monetary policies of major industrialized nations; the mild recession of
the early 1990s; the 2001 recession and the subsequent recovery and slowdown.7
How important is the G-7 factor in the evolution of national macroeconomic
aggregates? After all, if it is not quantitatively important, we should be less
concerned about re￿ning our measure of it. To address this question we compute
variance decompositions using the factor model (see the Appendix). Table 1
reports our ￿ndings. Beginning with output, the usual business cycle reference
variable, the world and national components are of equal importance in accounting
for variation in the typical G-7 country. Based on this statistic, the world cycle
merits as much scrutiny as the nation-speci￿c component. From the perspective
of individual countries, though, the picture is quite di⁄erent. The world factor
dominates the business cycles of France, Italy and Japan, on average accounting
6The G-7 factor is estimated quite precisely evidenced by the tightness of 10 percent and 90
percent posterior quintile bands available from the authors upon request.
7While not the focus of this paper, we also examine the behavior of nation -speci￿c factors
in detail. The results suggest that the nation-speci￿c factors capture most of the major peaks
and troughs of business cycles in each of the G-7 countries. The ￿gures of nation-speci￿c factors
are available from us upon request.
12for more than 70 percent of the variation. It is of less importance for the United
Kingdom and the United States, where it accounts for less than 15 percent of
output variation. There is no obvious correlation between the relative economic
size of a country and the importance of the G-7 factor.
Consumption tells a di⁄erent story in a couple of respects. First, the G-7
factor on average accounts for a lower share of consumption variance than does the
nation-speci￿c factor. At ￿rst blush this seems consistent with the consumption-
risking sharing puzzle, national consumption variance is not shared even among
these highly integrated, ￿nancial developed nations. Note, however, that the
national component of consumption is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from what we see
in output. The di⁄erence between income and consumption variance lies mostly in
the larger idiosyncratic term in the consumption decomposition. Thus it could be
that larger measurement errors in consumption than income measurement skew
international consumption correlations toward zero. While this certainly does
not solve the correlation or risk-sharing puzzle, it helps to mitigate the puzzle
somewhat.
Investment has a slightly more pronounced national component than output or
consumption. Averaging across the G-7 the nation-speci￿c component accounts
for roughly 50 percent of the variation. Though this is not much higher than was
true of output or consumption, the idiosyncratic component is almost as large
as the G-7 factor for the typical country. The international real business cycle
model predicts a large nation-speci￿c component in investment ￿ uctuations as
capital searches for its highest reward. The small G-7 component for investment
is consistent with this prediction.
To summarize, we have found sizable G-7, nation-speci￿c and variable-speci￿c
components in the main macroeconomic aggregates. The common and nation-
speci￿c components tend to be larger than the idiosyncratic component with the
exception of investment where it is on par with the G-7 component. Most of the
heterogeneity we see is across countries, with France, Italy and Japan sharing a
large common component and the United Kingdom and the United States busi-
ness cycles being mostly driven by national factors. Canada and Germany fall
between these extremes. The remainder of the paper is devoted to understanding
why there is a common cycle in the ￿rst place and how these similarities and
di⁄erences arise across countries. To develop this understanding we begin with
an analogous decomposition of our driving variables into G-7, nation-speci￿c and
variable-speci￿c components.
135. Properties of the driving variables
We begin this section brie￿ y discussing each driving variable in isolation. We
ask similar questions regarding these driving variables as were addressed in our
analysis of macroeconomic aggregates in the previous section. We ￿rst analyze the
evolution of each driving variable. We then focus on the relative importance of the
G-7, nation-speci￿c and variable-speci￿c components in explaining the volatility
of the driving variables.
5.1. Productivity, oil prices and the terms of trade
We ￿rst examine the properties of driving variables that are not instruments of
policy: productivity, oil prices and terms of trade. Policymakers clearly scrutinize
these variables to re￿ne their policy actions in light of the evolution of output
growth and in￿ ation. Economic growth accompanied by labor productivity ad-
vance is viewed as less likely to alter in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations than
situations when productivity growth stagnates. Oil price increases in the absence
of broad movements in in￿ ation are appropriately viewed as relative price changes,
though unpleasant policy tradeo⁄s may present themselves as a¢ rmed by the re-
cent emergence of concern about stag￿ ation voiced by o¢ cials at the U.S. Federal
Reserve. Productivity changes have been the dominant driver of quantitative
theory on business cycles in closed economy models, with oil prices and the terms
of trade taking a more prominent role in small open economy models.
To compute our productivity series, we use a standard Solow residual decom-
position for country i:
ai;t = yi;t ￿ sini;t ￿ (1 ￿ si)ki;t
where yi;t is the logarithm of output, si is the share of labor income in total
factor income, and ni;t and ki;t are measures of labor and capital inputs. The
most commonly used version of this decomposition in the international business
cycle literature is the one employed by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), which
uses gross domestic product for the output measure and total employment as the
labor input measure. The capital stock is not included in their decomposition. A
considerable amount of research has taken place since and we draw upon more
recent data and methodologies.
As we brie￿ y discussed in the data section, we use four di⁄erent measures of
productivity. The construction of the ￿rst two measures follows the methodol-
ogy in Klenow and Clare-Rodriguez (2005), using both capital and labor input
14measures in the computation of total factor productivity. One of their capital
measures includes human capital. Consistent with the approach used by Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1992), our other pair of measures use only labor data on the
input side. The ￿rst of these two uses gross domestic product and employment
(number employed, not hours) from the OECD. The second is from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and uses manufacturing output and total hours in manufac-
turing.8
The ￿rst panel of Table 2 reports the common, nation-speci￿c and variable-
speci￿c components of productivity. We see that the nation-speci￿c component
tends to dominate when we use the more elaborate decompositions including phys-
ical and human capital than those using basic labor input measures. The nation-
speci￿c component accounts for about two thirds of the variance in productivity
growth in these cases, the contribution of the G-7 and nation-speci￿c components
fall when we move to the simpler measures, but only to the point of equality.
The appearance of large idiosyncratic components in the simpler measure is con-
sistent with the omission of capital measures in the computation of the Solow
residual in these cases. The fact that the BLS measure has a full third of its vari-
ance accounted for by the idiosyncratic component may be due to the fact that
this measure includes only manufacturing while the other three span the entire
production side of the macroeconomy.
Taken at face value, the results indicate that while the G-7 countries are not
technologically integrated in the literal sense of sharing a common productivity
level, there is a large common component. Figure 2 plots the G-7 business cycle
factor against the G-7 productivity factor, their correlation is 0.69. As we shall
see in the next section, productivity will be a key driving variable both at the
G-7 and national level. The implication is that business cycle models focusing on
productivity shocks will need the nation-speci￿c components of productivity to
8Focusing on the manufacturing sector in each country, we used manufacturing output and
employment data from the BLS as our measures of output and labor input. Broadening our
analysis to the entire economy, we used GDP measures and total civilian employment from the
OECD. The correlation of the two productivity measures in growth rates averages 0.81, but there
are important di⁄erences across them. First, manufacturing productivity is more volatile than
overall productivity. The standard deviation of the growth rate manufacturing productivity is on
average roughly 2.5 times higher than the analogous measure using total output (1.97 compared
to 0.81). Second, the bilateral cross-country correlations of manufacturing productivity are
higher than those computed for GDP in most cases, but the di⁄erences are not statistically
signi￿cant. This is consistent with a broader literature that documents larger international
productivity di⁄erences in the service sector than the goods sector.
15generate positive international output spillovers. Models with supply-side comple-
mentarities such as Ambler, Cardia and Zimmerman (2002) fall into this category.
Coordinated monetary and ￿scal policies that shift world demand are two other
candidates.
Turning to the relative price of oil in Table 3, we see that the G-7 compo-
nent accounts for virtually all of the variation. Recall that this relative price is
computed as the U.S. dollar price of, say, West Texas crude petroleum converted
to domestic currency at the spot exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the
home currency and then de￿ ated by the national CPI level. While it is well known
that the U.S. dollar prices of varieties of crude petroleum correlate strongly, it is
surprising that this is also true of the relative price of oil in terms of the broader
consumer basket in each nation. As we shall we, oil is one of the few driving
variables that could be said to literally be a common shock to all G-7 nations.
The variance decomposition for the terms of trade is found in Table 4. As
noted by Backus and Crucini (2000), the terms of trade and the relative price
of oil tend to be highly correlated for the G-7 due to the higher variance of oil
prices relative to other goods and services entering into trade ￿ ows. Moreover, oil
accounts for a non-trivial share of trade even in highly industrialized countries.
Figure 3 presents the G-7 common factor for oil and G-7 factor for the terms
of trade along with the G-7 business cycle factor. The correlation of the terms
of trade and the relative price of oil in terms of the common factors is evident in
the ￿gure, particularly at the points of the sharp oil price increases in 1974, 1979,
1999 and 2005 and the drop in 1986. The correlation between the two factors over
the entire sample is 0.76.
Backus and Crucini (2000) conclude that exogenous shifts in oil supply from
OPEC producers can account for only about 10% of output variance in a sample
of countries overlapping signi￿cantly with those include here. Consistent with
their ￿ndings, the correlation between the G-7 business cycle factor and G-7 oil
price factor (G-7 terms of trade factor) is 0.03 (0.12) for the full sample. One
should keep in mind, however, that theory predicts an ambiguous sign: exogenous
oil supply shocks generate a negative correlation, while increases in oil demand
by the G-7 generate a positive correlation. Since the oil price shocks are often
associated with periods of dramatic oil price changes, we tend to see oil prices,
the terms of trade and world output behaving consistently with the supply-shock
interpretation. In most periods, however, the correlation of the terms of trade,
oil and G-7 output is weak and ambiguous.
As one might expect, when the oil prices are less volatile the correlation of
16the terms of trade and oil prices falls considerably. This is evident when we
compare the variance decomposition of the terms of trade to that of the relative
price of oil. Table 4 shows that the G-7 terms of trade is not dominated by the
world component, though it remains considerable, at between 40 and 50 percent,
depending on the terms of trade measure.
5.2. Monetary and ￿scal policy variables
Our goal is to capture periods of monetary and ￿scal expansion and contraction in
each country as well as the extent to which these policies are followed concurrently
across the G-7. What the dynamic factor model allows us to do is to extract the
common dynamic component from the multiple observable measures of monetary
or ￿scal policy.





























where ￿￿i;t, ￿ei;t and ￿gi;t are the growth rates of total revenue, total expenditure
and consumption by the national government of country i.
Thus we have three measures of ￿scal policy, each with a di⁄erent amount of
information about the intentions of the ￿scal authority. Loosely speaking, if a
variable contains a lot of information about ￿scal policy its factor loading, B or
b, will be larger in absolute value, indicating that it reacts more to the changes in
￿scal policy. For example, it may be the case that a decision to change the thrust
of ￿scal policy is largely carried out through changes in government revenues,
in this case the factor loading associated with revenues will be the highest (our
variance decompositions give us more information on this). In the language of the
dynamic factor literature we are extracting a signal (here of ￿scal policy) from
three measures of that signal.
The error terms ("￿ s) contain two components under this interpretation of the
signal extraction problem. One component is the noise component, which may be
interpreted as simply measurement error. The second component is the idiosyn-
cratic movement in a particular variable that does not have an interpretation as
changes in broadly de￿ned ￿scal policy but of targeted, sector speci￿c changes, for
example, perhaps changes aimed to lessen income inequality (by lowering labor
tax rates and raising capital tax rates). We are unable to distinguish between the
two interpretations of the error term.






















The short-term real interest rate is designed to capture changes in a variable tar-
geted by the central bank. Of course, since we use market rates, much of the
variation will be due to supply and demand factors in each country and care must
be taken when we attempt to interpret movements in the context of monetary
policy discussions. The narrow monetary variable is included to incorporate the
fact that central banks use monetary growth as an instrument as well. This may
take the form of medium term targeting of money growth with a particular in￿ a-
tion target in mind or some short term interaction of narrow monetary aggregates
and the setting of short-term interest rate targets.
Tables 5 and 6 contain the variance decompositions for the policy variables.
The most striking feature of these results is how di⁄erent short-term interest rates
and monetary aggregates look through the lens of the factor model. Short term
real interest rates are dominated by a common G-7 component, with two-thirds
of the variance attributable to the common factor and almost none attributed to
the nation-speci￿c component. Money growth, in contrast, is dominated by the
idiosyncratic component though a sizable nation-speci￿c variation is also found.
The large world component in short-term real interest rates has a number of
possible interpretations. The most obvious interpretation is that ￿nancial markets
are highly integrated and capital mobility tends to drive the rate of return to
capital in the same direction internationally. This is good news for models that
feature trade in bonds and physical capital mobility. A policy interpretation
is also possible here, namely the desire to avoid either large short-term capital
movements or sharp exchange rate responses to uncoordinated movements in the
interest rate target across the G-7. Finally, the common factor could be picking up
the common factor in the business cycles of the G-7. Since business cycles tend to
be positively correlated across countries, it is natural to expect real interest rates
to share that correlation pattern too. The latter explanation is of particular
interest because the cyclicality of the real interest rate within individual countries
have been di¢ cult to establish. Therefore, to the extent we ￿nd one at the level
of G-7 countries, is encouraging.9
9Barro and Sal-i-Martin (1990) construct a world interest rate variable using a di⁄erent
methodology and ￿nd it depends mostly on world factors.
18That money growth lacks a large common component is not surprising given
the di⁄erent in￿ ationary histories of the countries in the cross-section. Somewhat
more surprising is the size of the idiosyncratic component. This could be due to
shifts in money demand across near substitutes within a country and di⁄erences
in the de￿nitions of money across countries.
Figures 4 and 5 present the G-7 ￿scal and monetary factors, respectively,
alongside the G-7 business cycle factor. We see a dramatic swing in monetary
policy from stimulative in the 1970￿ s to contractionary in the late 1970s and
particularly the early 1980￿ s. This is consistent with the broad brush view that
monetary growth and low nominal and real interest rates set the world economy
into a boom and in￿ ationary spiral, followed by a concerted e⁄ort by the U.S.
Federal Reserve and other central bankers to tame in￿ ation. The very gradual
down-slope of the world monetary factor in the 1980￿ s and 1990￿ s is consistent
with the gradual disin￿ ation and moderating real interest rate levels that were at
least partly a result of establishing central bank credibility on the in￿ ation front.
The world ￿scal factor is sharply countercyclical in the ￿rst part of the sample,
most notable in the sharp recession of the early 1970￿ s. Later in the sample,
the correlation becomes ambiguous. The countercyclicality is likely due to the
normal evolution of tax revenue and non-discretionary spending over the cycle
with tax revenue falling and expenditure rising. The later period has some large
discretionary changes in tax rates, such as the Reagan and Thatcher tax cuts.
While tax cuts are unlikely to have a stimulative impact contemporaneously, they
may be responsible for a shift in the business cycle phase of ￿scal policy. We will
have more to say about this when we turn to rolling correlation analysis of the
G-7 factors.
6. What drives international business cycles?
Up to now we have described the common and nation-speci￿c components of na-
tional business cycles and the variables that business cycle theorists have proposed
as driving variables. What we would like to know is how much of a nation￿ s output
variation is generated by common and nation-speci￿c sources of variation in each
of the driving variables.
196.1. Deconstructing the G-7 and national business cycle
The ￿rst step in undertaking this exercise, is to regress the common component
of the G-7 business cycle on the common G-7 components of each of the driving
factors:
FY;t = BMFM;t + BFFF;t + BOFO;t + BAFA;t + BTFT;t + "Y;t
By applying the variance operator to the both sides of this equation, we can
decompose the variance of the estimated G-7 real business cycle into the parts
due to each of the driving variables plus an idiosyncratic component. In order to
ensure that the variance sums to one hundred, we ￿rst orthogonalize the factors
for each of the driving variables. Speci￿cally, we orthogonalize the regressors by
￿rst regressing the second factor on the ￿rst factor, and retaining the residual
as the orthogonalized second factor. We proceed sequentially projecting factors
onto the orthogonalized factors until we have a set of 5 orthogonalized factors.
The order of orthogonalization we employ is the order the variables appear above:
monetary policy, ￿scal policy, oil prices, productivity and the terms of trade. This
ordering implies that we use the monetary factor as it is estimated by the factor
model and the orthogonal terms of trade factor is the part of the estimated factor
that is orthogonal to all other factors.
The result of this exercise suggests that productivity is the main driving vari-
able for the common component of the business cycles among the G-7. In partic-
ular, this factor accounts for 47 percent of the ￿ uctuations in the G-7 real factor
over the full sample period. The terms of trade factor accounts for less than 1.5
percent of the movements in the G-7 cycle, while oil, ￿scal and monetary factors
account for even less than one percent. A caveat to these results is that they
represent a decomposition of the unconditional variance over the whole period. It
is certainly plausible that some variables, such as oil, play an important role in
certain sub-periods, as pointed out in section 5.1.
To complete our variance decomposition at the level of individual macroeco-
nomic aggregates we need to also include the national speci￿c components. To
accomplish this, we employ the procedure described above with one of the Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts aggregates on the left hand side and either
the complete list of G-7 common factors (i.e., the common factor driving mone-
tary policy, ￿scal policy, productivity, the terms of trade and oil across the G-7)
or complete list of the nation-speci￿c driving variables on the right hand side.
It is important to note that while the factors are orthogonalized with respect to
each other in both the G-7 and nation-speci￿c categories, these components need
20not have a zero covariance with each other. The nation-speci￿c component of ￿s-
cal policy may be correlated with the G-7 component of productivity, for example.
Thus, when we add up the contributions of the G-7 shocks and the nation-speci￿c
shocks, they need not add up to less than 100%. If these two factors are orthog-
onal, the result is a unique variance decomposition with only the idiosyncratic
factors left as a residual. In practice, the G-7 factors and nation-speci￿c factor
have non-zero sample correlation so there are instances where some ambiguity
arises in assigning, say, the U.S. output ￿ uctuations to the G-7 productivity fac-
tor versus the U.S. nation-speci￿c monetary factor. The results suggest that the
sum of the two variance decompositions is usually less than one hundred, and
rarely much greater than one hundred. We interpret the results as being an upper
bound on the variance contribution of the G-7 and nation-speci￿c components.
We begin with the decomposition of output, reported in Table 7. Taken
together, the driving variables account for a substantial portion of the variation
in output growth. The G-7 common factor on average explains a smaller share of
the variation than the nation-speci￿c factors. Italy and Japan appear to be the
most idiosyncratic with the national components of driving variables accounting
for more than 90 percent of the variation. Canada and the United States lie
at the other end of the distribution with a very signi￿cant role for the common
components of the driving variables.
At ￿rst glance the results for France, Italy and Japan that the main driving
force of output in these countries is the nation-speci￿c component seems at odds
with the results in section 4 that output ￿ uctuations have a large G-7 component.
However, these results can be reconciled by ￿rst noticing that for these three
countries productivity has a small G-7 component but a large nation￿ speci￿c
component. The latter component turns out to explain a large amount of output
variation. At the same time, our results above show that movements in the G-
7 productivity factor explain about 50 percent of the G-7 real factor. The G-7
component of movements in output in France, Italy and Japan are then due to
the 50 percent of the G-7 real cycle that remains unexplained.10
Turning to the individual driving variables, the columns are ordered by the
fraction of output variance accounted for by the national component of the driving
variable. By this metric the most important driving variable, by far, is produc-
10Recall also that the variance decomposition of the nation-speci￿c and G7 components come
from separate regressions and need not sum to one. It turns out that for France, Italy and Japan
the correlation between the country and G-7 factors is the largest, implying that the results for
these three countries must be somewhat less than the reported upper bounds.
21tivity, followed by ￿scal factors and monetary factors. Oil prices and the terms of
trade play a very small role overall. For oil prices, it is the common component
that is slightly more important, which makes sense given the signi￿cant role of
OPEC pricing decisions over the sample period we have.
To the extent that productivity movements re￿ ect technological shifts, they
are not universally shared. The nation-speci￿c component rivals the common G-7
component, each on average accounting for between 30 and 50 percent of output
growth. Variation in the contribution of the common factor in productivity in
the cross-section of countries is signi￿cant, ranging from a low of 18 percent in
the United Kingdom to a high of 54 percent in Canada. Thus the importance
of the G-7 factors overall for Canada and the United States is a combination of
productivity shocks and the ￿scal factor.
Comparing monetary and ￿scal factors, the nation-speci￿c component plays a
slightly more important role in the case of monetary factors while the G-7 factor
tends to be more important in a few cases for ￿scal factors. We do not want to
overstate the di⁄erences here because the absolute variances associated with them
are small and for most countries neither component plays a large role.
Table 7 reports the results for consumption growth. We see similar patterns
to what was found in our examination of output growth. In particular, taken
together, the G-7 and national components are both important and the produc-
tivity tends to dominate as a driving variable. Again, the nation-speci￿c factors
are particularly strong in Italy and Japan while the G-7 factor is more relevant
in Canada and the United States. The nation-speci￿c monetary factors and the
G-7 common ￿scal factor again account for a lower order of magnitude of business
cycles in consumption. While the role of oil is still marginal, the terms of trade
as a driving variable on average plays a slightly more important role in explaining
consumption than it does output. Given that consumption on average constitutes
two-thirds of aggregate output, the similarity of the output and consumption re-
sults is not altogether unexpected.
Table 7 also repeats the exercise for investment. Here a key di⁄erence rela-
tive to earlier variables emerges, namely that nation-speci￿c factor plays a much
more important role than the G-7 factor does when all of the driving variables are
considered together. In particular, the nation-speci￿c productivity factor is much
more important than the G-7 productivity factor in explaining the investment
growth variation. This is consistent with the view that changes in the marginal
productivity of capital across countries is an important facet of investment dy-
namics in an integrated world economy. In the case of monetary and ￿scal policy
22variables, while the G-7 factor is more important than the nation-speci￿c factors,
this results is mostly driven by a small set of countries. Neither oil price nor the
terms of trade factor appears to matter in explaining investment ￿ uctuations.
6.2. Toward a business cycle chronology
The seminal work by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) is most often associated with
the robust correlation between monetary events and the real business cycle. How-
ever, part of what distinguishes their work from modern business cycle research is
the attention to detail at the level of individual business cycles and even phases of
individual business cycles. This allowed them to provide texture to the chronol-
ogy, when monetary policy may have played a crucial role and when it was more
passive. Modern analysis typically reduces the business cycle to a set of moment
conditions, often without attention to possible shifts in the relationships among
endogenous and exogenous variables over time. A recent exception is the Great
Moderation literature which focuses on the falling business cycle volatility over
the most recent quarter century.
Here we draw inspiration from Friedman and Schwartz, but follow the modern
literature by characterizing the chronology of business cycles in terms of time
series moments. We focus on the G-7 cycle. To accomplish this we compute
ten-year centered moving average correlations between the common G-7 business
cycle factor and the common G-7 components of each of the driving variables.
Figure 6 presents the results.
Since we are relating the common components to each other, a good starting
point is the correlation of the common real factor with aggregate G-7 output (not
shown in Figure 6), which averages 0.76 over the period. Thus the common real
factor we extract from the G-7 NIPA aggregates is strongly correlated with the
G-7 business cycle measured as a country-size weighted average of their output
series. The correlation is quite stable over time, rising from 0.71 to 0.80 as we
move from the ￿rst 10 year interval to the last (recall we lose 5 years of data at
each end point in the rolling correlation).
From here on we will use the term world business cycle to refer to the G-7
real factor. The correlation of the world business cycle and G-7 productivity is a
healthy 0.51, it falls only slightly from 0.56 to 0.46 as we move from about 1970
to 1995. Figure 6 shows the full time path of the rolling correlations. Note that
the correlation of the other driving variables with the G-7 business cycle are both
lower and less stable over time.
23The G-7 ￿scal factor, for example, is quite stable and negative over the ￿rst
part of the sample, it then jumps to about zero from the late 1980￿ s to the late
1990￿ s, before falling back down toward the end of the sample. It is tempting to
interpret the earlier period as ￿scally passive in the sense of a tendency of tax
revenue to fall and expenditures to rise in the absence of legislative actions due
to the progressivity of the income tax, procyclicality of capital gains and pro￿t
taxes and movements in non-discretionary spending, such as welfare payments
and unemployment assistance. The absence of a clear cyclical pattern to ￿scal
policy reported in many business cycle papers is consistent what we ￿nd toward
the end of the sample. The fact that the correlation is strikingly negative across
the world in the earlier period is important because it suggests a more important
role for ￿scal policy in the past, which may have been overlooked in the existing
literature.
Monetary policy oscillates from a strongly positively correlated with the G-7
cycle to strongly negatively correlated. Broadly speaking, monetary policy ap-
pears to be accommodating in most periods except the early 1980￿ s, when central
bankers made concerted e⁄orts to reduce in￿ ationary trends, and in the mid-
1990￿ s which seems to match up with the increases in the discount rate during the
productivity and stock market boom.
The correlation of the oil price factor and the world business cycle moves from
-0.17 to 0.24 across the decades. While these averages are closer to zero than
some of the others, it is instructive to examine Figure 6 more carefully. We
see what appears to be a rising trend in the correlation with sharp reversals at
the dates of sharp increases in the relative price of oil. These patterns seem
broadly consistent with a recent hypothesis concerning the relationship between
the business cycle and the relative price of oil. Some economists have argued that
the relative importance of negative oil supply disruptions versus positive demand
shifts have changed signi￿cantly over time. The conventional wisdom of sharp
exogenous increases due to supply disruption and OPEC pricing decisions seems
consistent with the negative correlation, a contractionary oil price increase. The
notion that sharply rising demand for energy by newly industrializing countries,
India and China prominent among them, would give rise to a positive correlation
to the extent the real growth spillovers to the G-7 are positive (which seems very
likely).
Examining the contribution of G-7 and nation-speci￿c movements in the driving
variables over time and in particular business cycle episodes is an important area
for future research. The broad correlations outlined here are suggestive of some
24of the themes that could emerge from such an examination.
7. Conclusion
We have studied the time series properties of the key driving variables that often
appear in international business cycle models: productivity, monetary policy vari-
ables, ￿scal policy variables, oil prices and the terms of trade. In particular, we
employ dynamic factor models to estimate the common and nation-speci￿c fac-
tors in each of these driving variables. We documented the role of a G-7 common
factor in each of these variables and found that the common factor is very domi-
nant for oil prices, considerable for productivity, interest rates targeted by central
banks, and the terms of trade, but of minor importance for monetary aggregates
and ￿scal balance sheet items (such as total expenditure).
There has been much interest in the extent to which there is an international
business cycle in macroeconomic aggregates such as output, consumption and
investment. We con￿rm previous ￿ndings that such a cycle does indeed exist. We
then take the next step and ￿nd the source of the international business cycle to
be primarily driven by productivity, though we are only able to explain roughly
half of the variation in the G-7 cycle. A visual inspection of the international
cycle and the driving variables shows that in some episodes oil prices move with
the cycle, but this relationship has changed over time.
Turning to individual countries, our ￿ndings suggest that the common G-7
business cycle is important for the evolution of most macroeconomic aggregates
and the driving variables of business cycles, including policy variables. Despite
the signi￿cance of the common G-7 component in many of these variables, most
appear to play a relatively minor role in explaining aggregate real business cycle
￿ uctuations, with the exception of productivity.
We believe that future work would bene￿t from developing a chronology of
business cycles along the lines of Friedman and Schwartz and Burns and Mitchell.
This could be done at the level of the world business cycle and nation-speci￿c
variations from the common component. Such an exercise would likely bring
important nuances to individual business cycle episodes as well as policy responses
to di⁄erent causal factors than it possible with the ￿rst pass we have attempted
here.
Statistical appendix
Bayesian estimation of dynamic factor models
25This appendix reviews the methodology used in estimating the dynamic factor
model. The model here is a multi-factor extension of the single dynamic unob-
served factor model in Otrok and Whiteman (1998). Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman
(2003) also employ a similar multi-factor model in an exercise studying Interna-
tional business cycles. Since they provide a detailed discussion of the multi-factor
model, this section is brief and closely follows the description in that paper.
Our interest in estimating the dynamic factor model is to characterize the
joint posterior of the model parameters and latent factors. Since analytic forms
for the joint posterior of the factors and parameters are unobtainable, we employ
numerical methods to simulate from the posterior. To do so we use a ￿data
augmentation￿algorithm to generate draws from the joint posterior of interest
(see Tanner and Wong, 1987; Otrok and Whiteman, 1998). Data augmentation in
this context builds on the following key observation: if the factors were observable,
under a conjugate prior, the factor models we estimate would each constitute a
simple set of regressions with Gaussian autoregressive errors. Then, conditional
on the regression parameters and the data, one can determine the conditional
distribution of the factors. It is straightforward to generate random samples from
this conditional distribution, and such samples can be employed as stand-ins for
the unobserved factors.
To be more speci￿c, the dynamic factor models can be thought of as consisting
of a speci￿cation of a Gaussian probability density for the data fytg conditional
on a set of parameters ￿ and a set of latent variables fftg. Call this den-
sity function gy(Y j￿;F) where Y denotes the vector of data on the observ-
able data, and F denotes the vector of dynamic factors. In addition, there is
a speci￿cation of a Gaussian probability density gf(F) for F itself. Given a
prior distribution for ￿, ￿(￿), the joint posterior distribution for the parame-
ters and the latent variables is given by the product of the likelihood and prior,
h(￿;FjY ) = gy(Y j￿;F)gf(F)￿(￿). As is shown in Otrok and Whiteman (1998),
although the joint posterior h(￿;FjY ) is extremely cumbersome, under a conju-
gate prior for ￿ the two conditional densities h(￿jF;Y ) and h(Fj￿;Y ) are quite
simple. Moreover, it is possible to use this fact and Markov-Chain Monte Carlo
methods (MCMC) to generate an arti￿cial sample f￿j;Fjg for j = 1;:::;J as
follows:
1. Starting from a value F0 in the support of the posterior distribution for F,
generate a random drawing ￿1 from the conditional density h(￿jF0;Y ).
2. Now generate a random drawing F1 from the conditional density h(Fj￿1;Y ).
3. This process is repeated, generating at each step drawings ￿j~h(￿jFj￿1;Y )
26and Fj~h(Fj￿j￿1;Y ).
Under regularity conditions satis￿ed here (see Tanner and Wong, 1987), the
sample so produced is a realization of a Markov chain whose invariant distribution
is the joint posterior h(￿;FjY ). What makes this process feasible is the simplicity
of the two conditional distributions. For example, h(￿jF;Y ) is easily constructed
from the linear factor model when F is known. In particular, the linear factor
model is just a normal linear regression model for yi given the factors (albeit a
regression that has autocorrelated errors that requires the use of the procedure in
Chib and Greenberg, 1994, to simulate from the posterior). The other conditional
density, h(Fj￿;Y ) is a little more complicated because it is the solution to a
Gaussian signal extraction problem. Otrok and Whiteman (1998) derive this
distribution, which turns out to be a Normal distribution.
The prior on all the factor loading coe¢ cients is N(0;10), which is quite di⁄use.








5 . Because the data are growth rates, this prior embodies
the notion that growth is not serially correlated though the prior is loose enough
to allow for signi￿cant serial correlation; also, the probability that lags are zero
grows with the length of the lag.11 Experimentation with tighter and looser priors
for both the factor loadings and the autoregressive parameters did not produce
qualitatively important changes in the results reported below. The prior on the
innovation variances in the observable equations is Inverted Gamma (6;0:001),
which is also quite di⁄use.
Variance decompositions
To measure the relative contributions of the G-7, nation-, and variable-speci￿c
factors to variations in aggregate variables in each country, we estimate the share
of the variance of each macroeconomic aggregate due to each factor. In particular,
we decompose the variance of each observable into the fraction that is due to each
of the two factors and the variable-speci￿c component. With orthogonal factors











t ) + var("i;t)
11Otrok and Whiteman (1998) discuss the procedure for ensuring stationarity of the lag poly-
nomial. The method involves drawing from a truncated Normal distribution in the Metropolis-
Hastings step.







These measures are calculated at each pass of the Markov chain; dispersion in
their posterior distributions re￿ ects uncertainty regarding their magnitudes.
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30Figure 1. Three views of the world business cycle.
Figure 2. The G-7 business cycle factor and G-7 productivity.
31Figure 3. The G-7 business cycle factor, G-7 terms of trade and G-7 relative oil price.
Figure 4. The G-7 business cycle factor and the common G-7 ￿scal factor.
32Figure 5. The G-7 business cycle factor and the common G-7 monetary factor.
Figure 6. 10 year rolling correlations between the G-7 business cycle factor and
the common factors of each of the driving variables.
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  34
Country Factor 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66%
Canada G-7 33.50 35.91 38.43 17.61 19.57 21.46 5.17 6.55 8.05
Nation-Specific 49.51 52.32 54.92 66.36 68.76 71.39 53.77 56.38 58.93
Variable-Specific 10.19 11.67 13.20 9.64 11.45 13.20 34.80 36.88 38.84
France G-7 77.21 79.98 82.68 51.11 56.15 61.09 51.24 54.32 57.57
Nation-Specific 10.51 13.37 16.30 16.16 22.30 29.65 12.89 16.68 20.81
Variable-Specific 5.28 6.59 7.90 18.17 20.83 23.00 26.44 28.74 30.69
Germany G-7 45.73 48.97 52.26 30.71 33.37 35.67 19.11 21.64 24.35
Nation-Specific 38.66 42.31 45.95 38.58 41.88 45.32 51.96 55.50 59.12
Variable-Specific 6.72 8.34 10.02 22.77 24.91 27.09 20.67 22.84 24.90
Italy G-7 70.15 73.98 77.53 60.28 64.91 69.36 28.20 31.45 34.66
Nation-Specific 10.48 13.83 17.00 13.14 17.73 22.43 28.90 35.09 40.40
Variable-Specific 10.28 12.00 13.70 15.64 17.29 18.94 30.75 33.92 37.35
Japan G-7 54.83 57.96 61.16 48.26 52.04 55.64 51.60 54.82 57.74
Nation-Specific 36.52 39.64 42.77 32.62 36.27 39.81 37.42 40.26 43.59
Variable-Specific 1.85 2.24 2.71 10.96 11.62 12.33 4.27 4.84 5.39
UK G-7 12.05 13.99 15.96 2.52 3.36 4.28 9.58 11.45 13.15
Nation-Specific 69.48 72.86 76.02 63.97 66.87 69.98 40.58 43.30 46.12
Variable-Specific 10.35 12.79 15.76 26.72 29.64 32.29 43.01 45.11 47.30
US G-7 13.87 15.89 17.90 10.03 12.02 14.03 3.58 4.74 5.99
Nation-Specific 76.96 79.40 81.74 61.39 63.76 66.06 80.24 81.99 83.69
Variable-Specific 3.38 4.35 5.45 22.98 24.13 25.21 12.04 13.35 14.53
AVERAGE G-7 46.67 34.49 26.42
Nation-Specific 44.82 45.37 47.03
Variable-Specific 8.28 19.98 26.53
MEDIAN G-7 52.26 35.67 24.35
Nation-Specific 45.95 45.32 46.12
Variable-Specific 10.02 23.00 30.69
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Country Factor 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66%
Canada G-7 34.05 47.23 55.32 33.22 46.55 54.61 61.48 69.33 74.31 62.77 70.57 76.49
Nation-Specific 43.57 51.69 65.02 44.22 52.27 65.55 10.06 14.84 24.16 2.08 4.69 11.86
Variable-Specific 0.74 0.88 1.04 0.80 0.95 1.12 14.20 15.48 16.56 21.07 23.51 25.97
France G-7 25.94 27.93 30.25 27.34 29.42 31.67 35.62 40.93 46.73 35.07 38.87 43.04
Nation-Specific 68.71 71.04 73.10 67.31 69.54 71.65 33.58 37.59 41.46 19.78 22.52 24.94
Variable-Specific 0.67 0.79 0.95 0.65 0.78 0.94 19.97 21.61 22.92 37.23 38.89 40.20
Germany G-7 9.04 10.82 12.88 13.86 15.95 18.59 45.25 49.92 57.42 43.29 47.72 52.76
Nation-Specific 46.15 51.22 56.45 39.63 44.20 48.48 16.25 20.86 25.54 13.93 17.91 22.21
Variable-Specific 32.76 37.21 42.16 35.69 39.11 42.57 22.12 25.41 29.21 29.65 32.37 35.39
Italy G-7 13.82 16.23 18.35 13.34 15.70 17.79 28.04 31.80 35.63 25.95 29.58 33.77
Nation-Specific 81.46 83.61 86.04 82.04 84.12 86.51 49.04 52.18 55.49 36.24 39.31 42.10
Variable-Specific 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.17 15.55 16.16 16.73 30.46 31.45 32.19
Japan G-7 13.55 16.10 19.86 12.98 15.55 19.13 16.53 20.74 27.03 12.17 15.00 19.97
Nation-Specific 79.52 83.34 85.97 79.96 83.74 86.43 63.17 69.07 72.82 61.91 66.74 69.55
Variable-Specific 0.32 0.39 0.48 0.45 0.52 0.63 9.84 10.36 10.78 17.93 18.28 18.56
UK G-7 27.36 31.70 35.46 22.04 26.31 29.91 21.02 23.36 25.72 29.07 31.45 33.65
Nation-Specific 63.08 66.84 71.22 68.77 72.39 76.62 44.07 46.40 48.83 19.88 21.89 24.19
Variable-Specific 1.06 1.25 1.48 0.99 1.20 1.44 29.78 30.30 30.80 45.34 46.48 47.53
US G-7 34.00 43.26 49.83 44.60 55.11 61.65 38.25 47.25 52.53 25.12 33.16 39.40
Nation-Specific 43.54 50.34 59.61 34.11 40.95 51.07 34.15 39.73 48.24 20.30 26.45 34.63
Variable-Specific 5.30 6.08 6.91 3.46 4.02 4.64 12.68 13.45 14.22 39.03 40.02 41.04
AVERAGE G-7 27.61 29.23 40.48 38.05
Nation-Specific 65.44 63.89 40.10 28.50
Variable-Specific 6.68 6.67 18.97 33.00
MEDIAN G-7 27.93 26.31 40.93 33.16
Nation-Specific 66.84 69.54 39.73 22.52
Variable-Specific 0.88 0.95 16.16 32.37
Table 2. Variance Decompositions for Productivity Measures
KRC1 KRC2 OECD BLS
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Country Factor 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66%
Canada G-7 88.23 89.31 93.14 89.65 90.53 94.22 86.75 87.91 90.70 85.80 86.98 91.49
Nation-Specific 6.83 10.67 11.75 4.68 8.30 9.20 5.89 8.72 9.86 8.45 12.98 14.15
Variable-Specific 0.03 0.04 0.05 1.13 1.15 1.17 3.37 3.40 3.43 0.03 0.05 0.06
France G-7 88.98 89.76 94.59 89.25 90.06 94.60 86.97 87.72 91.81 86.53 87.37 92.86
Nation-Specific 5.40 10.23 10.98 4.39 8.89 9.69 5.04 9.14 9.87 7.13 12.61 13.44
Variable-Specific 0.02 0.03 0.04 1.02 1.03 1.05 3.13 3.15 3.17 0.02 0.04 0.05
Germany G-7 89.20 89.99 94.71 90.06 90.85 95.23 86.94 87.68 91.63 86.68 87.56 92.94
Nation-Specific 5.29 10.00 10.78 3.81 8.13 8.91 5.18 9.14 9.89 7.03 12.42 13.28
Variable-Specific 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.96 0.99 1.02 3.15 3.17 3.19 0.02 0.04 0.05
Italy G-7 89.34 89.99 94.67 89.71 90.36 94.73 87.22 87.97 91.77 86.88 87.60 92.94
Nation-Specific 5.31 9.99 10.64 4.16 8.51 9.13 4.91 8.73 9.46 7.04 12.37 13.09
Variable-Specific 0.02 0.03 0.05 1.10 1.12 1.15 3.29 3.31 3.33 0.02 0.04 0.05
Japan G-7 85.09 86.25 90.53 87.32 88.40 92.41 81.94 83.08 86.33 82.70 83.95 88.88
Nation-Specific 9.42 13.72 14.86 6.73 10.69 11.77 10.73 13.87 15.03 11.05 16.00 17.24
Variable-Specific 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.90 0.93 0.95 2.98 3.02 3.06 0.03 0.05 0.07
UK G-7 88.63 89.45 94.42 89.41 90.23 94.88 87.19 87.99 92.14 86.05 86.94 92.61
Nation-Specific 5.56 10.54 11.34 3.98 8.55 9.37 4.45 8.62 9.39 7.36 13.04 13.92
Variable-Specific 0.02 0.04 0.05 1.16 1.19 1.21 3.38 3.41 3.43 0.03 0.04 0.05
US G-7 86.97 88.10 92.59 88.45 89.43 93.70 85.25 86.44 90.28 84.35 85.58 90.76
Nation-Specific 7.38 11.88 13.01 5.20 9.44 10.39 6.36 10.19 11.37 9.20 14.40 15.61
Variable-Specific 0.03 0.04 0.05 1.12 1.15 1.17 3.35 3.38 3.40 0.03 0.04 0.06
AVERAGE G-7 88.98 89.98 86.97 86.57
Nation-Specific 11.00 8.93 9.77 13.40
Variable-Specific 0.04 1.08 3.26 0.04
MEDIAN G-7 89.45 90.23 87.72 86.98
Nation-Specific 10.54 8.55 9.14 12.98
Variable-Specific 0.04 1.12 3.31 0.04
Table 3. Variance Decompositions for Measures of Oil Prices
Average Dubai Brent West Texas
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Country Factor 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66%
Canada G-7 30.28 32.28 34.32 6.70 7.63 8.70
Nation-Specific 32.90 37.62 43.02 47.08 53.98 60.65
Variable-Specific 24.59 29.71 34.37 31.39 38.17 45.25
France G-7 70.76 73.25 75.83 68.04 70.50 72.89
Nation-Specific 5.67 9.16 12.49 5.76 9.02 12.81
Variable-Specific 14.21 17.52 20.28 16.85 20.53 23.25
Germany G-7 42.48 44.75 47.07 64.65 66.59 68.40
Nation-Specific 22.10 28.39 33.93 6.43 8.69 11.61
Variable-Specific 21.22 26.90 33.03 21.73 24.55 26.85
Italy G-7 37.43 39.83 42.24 75.56 77.76 80.15
Nation-Specific 38.65 43.61 48.32 9.79 11.74 13.79
Variable-Specific 12.44 16.41 20.56 8.18 10.04 11.73
Japan G-7 56.29 58.50 60.69 57.35 59.43 61.61
Nation-Specific 34.36 36.60 39.06 31.91 34.30 36.54
Variable-Specific 3.30 4.53 5.82 5.31 6.57 7.63
UK G-7 8.62 10.02 11.52 14.97 16.44 18.09
Nation-Specific 48.78 54.05 60.24 46.00 51.46 57.06
Variable-Specific 29.55 35.57 41.08 26.39 31.70 37.07
US G-7 36.81 38.94 40.89 49.38 51.35 53.30
Nation-Specific 47.58 50.50 53.26 37.52 39.99 42.46
Variable-Specific 8.62 10.74 12.81 6.64 8.43 10.36
AVERAGE G-7 42.51 49.96
Nation-Specific 37.13 29.88
Variable-Specific 20.20 20.00
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Country Factor 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66%
Canada G-7 79.23 81.40 83.41 3.90 4.90 5.93
Nation-Specific 0.47 1.29 3.45 11.85 27.73 49.48
Variable-Specific 12.76 15.44 17.82 45.44 66.88 83.37
France G-7 65.49 68.16 70.94 1.05 1.61 2.21
Nation-Specific 2.03 5.36 10.48 3.10 8.80 22.06
Variable-Specific 19.60 23.87 27.53 76.24 89.05 94.77
Germany G-7 32.38 34.47 36.69 1.12 1.63 2.19
Nation-Specific 2.77 6.49 14.73 10.50 27.60 52.88
Variable-Specific 49.46 56.48 60.96 45.04 70.73 87.50
Italy G-7 64.84 67.23 69.46 0.38 0.78 1.32
Nation-Specific 10.58 13.66 17.35 34.74 44.73 56.38
Variable-Specific 15.24 18.38 21.39 42.67 54.31 64.27
Japan G-7 44.19 46.41 48.58 13.93 15.53 17.17
Nation-Specific 9.56 14.03 19.41 21.96 31.02 40.59
Variable-Specific 33.82 38.90 43.41 43.80 53.33 62.20
UK G-7 63.70 66.25 68.50 3.78 4.62 5.57
Nation-Specific 3.37 5.54 9.04 24.73 41.78 58.87
Variable-Specific 23.29 26.95 30.08 36.38 53.60 70.98
US G-7 48.88 51.76 54.69 1.58 2.15 2.77
Nation-Specific 2.82 5.76 10.55 8.49 20.53 35.07
Variable-Specific 35.13 39.91 44.03 62.76 77.47 88.97
AVERAGE G-7 59.38 4.46
Nation-Specific 7.45 28.89
Variable-Specific 31.42 66.48
MEDIAN G-7 66.25 2.15
Nation-Specific 5.76 27.73
Variable-Specific 26.95 66.88
Short-Term Real Interest Rates Money Supply
Table 5. Variance Decompositions for Measures of Monetary Policies
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Country Factor 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66% 33% 50% 66%
Canada G-7 12.28 14.94 17.97 0.31 0.74 1.40 11.57 14.77 18.23
Nation-Specific 10.62 15.32 20.36 41.46 50.43 59.41 21.46 28.00 35.74
Variable-Specific 62.57 68.58 73.83 39.36 48.32 57.00 46.82 55.52 63.17
France G-7 16.71 21.01 25.47 18.49 21.49 24.59 0.80 1.65 2.84
Nation-Specific 16.55 23.37 32.72 20.88 29.41 39.37 0.42 1.04 2.22
Variable-Specific 44.92 54.41 61.45 38.37 49.02 57.41 94.56 96.19 97.44
Germany G-7 4.03 5.80 7.98 16.44 20.20 24.26 3.05 4.35 5.83
Nation-Specific 25.23 34.67 47.54 0.81 1.99 4.60 28.16 39.89 53.74
Variable-Specific 45.31 57.63 67.22 70.48 74.96 78.98 41.01 55.25 67.03
Italy G-7 5.89 8.58 11.78 34.30 38.52 42.73 3.09 4.73 6.78
Nation-Specific 1.63 4.03 9.02 11.12 19.44 28.69 5.59 10.80 17.66
Variable-Specific 78.57 84.85 88.67 31.58 40.37 48.46 77.23 82.83 87.03
Japan G-7 0.87 1.68 2.73 1.40 2.62 4.34 1.20 2.15 3.49
Nation-Specific 2.47 7.18 21.16 4.80 15.33 35.54 0.38 0.99 2.28
Variable-Specific 76.28 89.80 94.83 60.58 80.79 90.67 93.38 95.51 97.26
UK G-7 27.89 32.88 38.09 22.88 27.25 32.18 0.15 0.35 0.73
Nation-Specific 13.60 19.84 26.18 31.35 39.53 47.28 12.32 17.13 23.27
Variable-Specific 41.39 46.20 50.57 25.94 32.43 38.42 76.02 82.27 86.95
US G-7 0.41 0.95 1.90 3.76 6.23 9.21 38.93 44.23 49.55
Nation-Specific 54.72 60.36 65.97 51.59 57.53 63.14 1.74 3.48 5.90
Variable-Specific 32.30 37.89 43.31 29.01 34.53 40.20 44.71 50.73 56.69
AVERAGE G-7 12.26 16.72 10.32
Nation-Specific 23.54 30.52 14.47
Variable-Specific 62.77 51.49 74.04
MEDIAN G-7 8.58 20.20 4.35
Nation-Specific 19.84 29.41 10.80
Variable-Specific 57.63 48.32 82.27
Table 6. Variance Decompositions for Measures of Fiscal Policies
Government Consumption Government Expenditure Government Revenue
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G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National
Canada 53.84 10.42 19.54 0.88 0.04 0.02 0.15 0.28 0.39 0.07 73.95 11.66
France 40.13 78.84 1.34 0.46 2.66 0.02 0.28 0.97 0.12 0.45 44.53 80.73
Germany 35.69 15.87 1.94 14.54 8.50 0.53 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.01 47.00 30.95
Italy 20.15 86.20 4.90 0.96 1.11 0.00 3.05 4.98 1.48 0.17 30.69 92.32
Japan 25.74 80.29 0.00 0.91 4.71 10.17 1.84 0.21 0.24 0.00 32.52 91.58
UK 18.11 43.70 9.44 5.12 7.15 24.25 3.23 0.00 9.45 0.27 47.38 73.34
US 38.43 24.45 25.71 2.91 4.06 6.38 3.10 0.21 2.41 1.31 73.71 35.25
AVERAGE 33.16 48.54 8.98 3.68 4.03 5.91 1.66 0.95 2.14 0.32 49.97 59.40
MEDIAN 35.69 43.70 4.90 0.96 4.06 0.53 1.84 0.21 0.87 0.17 47.00 73.34
G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National
Canada 39.51 8.93 12.67 1.06 3.33 1.52 0.05 0.20 2.30 1.62 57.86 13.32
France 29.74 60.25 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.58 2.56 0.48 3.51 2.30 35.89 63.62
Germany 31.03 3.86 1.06 14.75 3.72 2.60 1.04 0.30 1.54 5.83 38.39 27.35
Italy 11.18 67.79 0.67 0.66 1.44 0.06 0.07 0.55 0.29 0.01 13.65 69.07
Japan 25.31 65.02 0.00 2.70 4.07 9.44 1.26 0.04 1.23 0.34 31.86 77.54
UK 4.23 35.24 0.67 0.68 7.47 29.40 1.85 0.32 13.61 1.40 27.82 67.04
US 42.60 12.20 11.26 3.90 4.79 18.63 8.84 0.21 8.77 0.30 76.27 35.23
AVERAGE 26.23 36.18 3.77 3.39 3.55 8.89 2.24 0.30 4.46 1.69 40.25 50.45
MEDIAN 29.74 35.24 0.67 1.06 3.72 2.60 1.26 0.30 2.30 1.40 35.89 63.62
G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National G-7 National
Canada 7.90 29.29 16.45 1.66 3.25 0.55 0.21 1.04 0.43 1.61 28.24 34.16
France 17.40 71.63 3.55 1.92 5.76 0.74 0.59 0.05 0.01 3.19 27.30 77.54
Germany 17.34 12.40 0.26 15.00 13.88 3.68 1.15 0.35 0.06 0.40 32.69 31.82
Italy 0.50 54.05 1.22 0.00 1.63 0.68 1.69 0.24 0.29 3.80 5.34 58.77
Japan 18.63 75.75 0.01 1.88 9.95 13.84 1.74 0.20 0.04 0.21 30.36 91.89
UK 7.54 27.60 2.72 3.11 10.17 11.47 0.46 0.03 1.71 0.25 22.60 42.47
US 24.29 31.68 32.12 0.05 2.80 5.44 1.35 0.04 2.09 2.24 62.65 39.45
AVERAGE 13.37 43.20 8.05 3.37 6.78 5.20 1.03 0.28 0.66 1.67 29.88 53.73
MEDIAN 17.34 31.68 2.72 1.88 5.76 3.68 1.15 0.20 0.29 1.61 28.24 42.47
Terms of Trade Total Productivity Fiscal Policy Monetary Policy Oil Price
Investment
Table 7.  Variance Decompositions for Macroeconomic Variables
Productivity Fiscal Policy Monetary Policy Oil Price Terms of Trade Total
Terms of Trade Total
Output
Consumption
Productivity Fiscal Policy Monetary Policy Oil Price
 
 
 